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Although Jung made a connection between his concept of the archetype and mankind’s 
evolutionary history throughout his career, he remained notoriously tight-lipped about his 
own specific views on evolutionary theory. In the final years of his life, however, he finally 
went more into detail about this important topic, putting forward a most thought-provoking 
idea: the notion that synchronicity, or meaning ful coincidences, had a role to play in the way 
evolution took shape. As I will argue in this paper, Jung’s comments on this topic present 
clear evidence that he did not think primarily along Darwinian lines, as has recently been 
claimed; rather, I will argue that he adopted what Wolfgang Pauli referred to as a third 
position—one that goes beyond both Darwinism and Lamarckism. This third position is 
strongly informed by the notion that evolutionary changes are not random but meaningful, 
and that synchronicity has a role to play in the way evolution takes shape. This suggests that 
Jung is not so much a kindred spirit to Neo-Darwinian evolutionary psychologists, but a 
thinker who is much closer in his intuitions and affinities to several evolutionary thinkers 
who have been inf luential in the field of transpersonal psychology, most notably Ken Wilber.
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In his foreword to Jung and the Postmodern (Hauke, 2000), Jung scholar Andrew Samuels noted that in the fifteen years which preceded the book’s 
publication something remarkable had happened: 
the field of post-Jungian studies had quietly gathered 
momentum and gained acceptance in the wider academic 
community. Samuels (2000) even went as far as to label 
this development “Jung’s return from banishment” 
(p. xi), and claimed that this time around, a re-
examination of Jung’s core ideas was taking place:
Over the last fifteen years I have been involved in 
the publication of around fifty-five volumes for 
Routledge which, it is generally agreed, cluster at 
the "academic", "demanding" and "critical" end 
of the range of analytical psychology and Jungian 
analysis. Over the same period, observers of the 
Jungian analytic and psychoanalytic scenes have 
noted in academic quarters and in intellectual life 
in general what has been termed Jung's return from 
banishment. Some of this re-examination of Jung 
and his work rests in a clearer understanding of the 
globally damning way in which it was dealt with by 
the psychoanalytic establishment. Some of it is due 
to the quiet penetration of a number of academic 
fields by those with knowledge of Jungian ideas 
and a desire to apply these ideas in their fields of 
interest and expertise. … Further re-examination 
stems from a recognition that comparisons between 
Jung's work and that of other writers or movements 
are much more substantial and important than we 
thought before and can no longer be disregarded if 
we are to retain any sort of academic and intellectual 
openness. (Samuels, 2000, p. xi) 
 Now, roughly fifteen years later, this re-
examination of Jung’s work shows no signs of abating. 
There have been a string of books and articles that 
highlight connections between Jung’s ideas and more 
recent intellectual developments, often claiming that 
Jung was a precursor of these developments in some 
way and deserves more credit for this than he has thus 
Meaningful Mutations: 
Reflections on the Synchronicity of Evolution
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 62 Rensma
far received. An aspect of Jung’s theoretical framework 
that has received considerable attention in this regard 
is his concept of the archetype, which a large number 
of authors have re-examined in light of more recent 
scientific developments. The work of Jungian analyst 
Anthony Stevens has been particularly influential in this 
context, who makes the case in his books Archetype (1982) 
and Archetype Revisited (2002) that what is arguably Jung’s 
most important hypothesis was in many ways ahead of its 
time.  Stevens (2002) himself put it as follows: 
For most of the twentieth century it was fashionable 
to focus on environmental influences and to ignore 
the hereditary ones. This is one reason why Jung’s 
theory of archetypes, which postulated innate 
structures, was ignored or rejected. Now that 
hereditary forces are receiving as much attention 
as environmental factors, evidence is accumulating 
that Jung was right. (p. xii)
 Stevens was among the first to point out that 
many contemporary thinkers who theorize about the 
psyche from an evolutionary perspective are defending 
positions that are highly similar to Jung’s position, 
and he has done extensive work on highlighting 
the similarities between Jung’s ideas and recent 
developments in evolutionary psychology, psychiatry, 
sociology, and anthropology. Other scholars who have 
made connections between the concept of the archetype 
and more recent scientific ideas and concepts are—
amongst others—Walters (1994), McDowell (2001), 
Knox (2002), MacLennan (2006), Merchant (2009), 
Haule (2010b), and Goodwyn (2010). 
 A commonly held outlook which has emerged 
as a result of this scientific re-examination of the concept 
of the archetype is that this concept is fully in line 
with recent Neo-Darwinian theories about the innate 
strucutres of the mind. Stevens is one of the most well-
known defenders of this position. At first glance, this 
interpretation of Jung’s ideas may have some appeal, as 
it is certainly true that many neo-Darwinian thinkers 
end up making statements which sound remarkably 
similar to statements made by Jung. Take, for example, 
the following passage from the work of Cosmides and 
Tooby (1997), two highly influential scholars in the field 
of evolutionary psychology:
[Evolutionary psychology] is not an area of study, 
like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way 
of thinking about psychology that can be applied to 
any topic within it. In this view, the mind is a set of 
information-processing machines that were designed 
by natural selection to solve adaptive problems faced 
by our hunter-gatherer ancestors. (n.p.)
 It is certainly true that one can find similar-
sounding passages in the Collected Works with ease, for 
example this one:
[There] are many things in the human psyche that 
were never acquired by the individual, for the human 
mind is not born a tabula rasa, nor is every man pro-
vided with a wholly new and unique brain. He is 
born with a brain that is the result of development 
in an endlessly long chain of ancestors. . . . All those 
factors, therefore, that were essential to our near 
and remote ancestors will also be essential to us, for 
they are embedded in the inherited organic system. 
(Jung, 1927/1931, para. 717)
 Despite these surface similarities, however, 
claiming that Jung’s concept of the archetype is fully 
compatible with such modern neo-Darwinian ideas is 
not without its problems. The most important reason for 
this is that there are also many passages in the Collected 
Works in which Jung seems to make use of a competing 
evolutionary theory to Darwinism: Lamarckism. This 
evolutionary theory, which is based on the notion that so-
called acquired characteristics are hereditary and passed 
on to future generations, is nowadays largely discredited, 
and the fact that passages exist in the Collected Works 
that have a Lamarckian feel has been used by scholars 
critical of Jung to argue that his theoretical framework 
is methodologically unsound. Several authors have, 
however, argued along a similar line as Stevens has in 
recent years: that Jung’s ideas about evolution can, in 
fact, be interpreted without friction as compatible with 
Neo-Darwinian thought. Claims to this effect have been 
made by Samuels (1985), Clarke (1992), Palmer (1997), 
and Hogenson (2001).1 
 Apart from Jung’s ideas about the concept of 
the archetype and his views on evolution, a third area 
of focus has emerged in recent Jungian scholarship that 
seeks to re-examine Jung’s ideas in light of modern 
scientific developments: Jung’s concept of synchronicity, 
or meaningful coincidences (a better and subtler definition 
of this concept is possible and will follow in the pages 
to come). As has happened with Jung’s concept of the 
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archetype, a variety of scholars have argued that Jung 
was ahead of his time in many ways with this concept, 
and have highlighted the similarities and connections 
to more recent developments. Joseph Cambray, for 
example, has done important work that compares Jung’s 
ideas about synchronicity to recent developments in 
chaos and complexity theory—his book Synchronicity: 
Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe (2009) 
is probably the best introduction to this particular 
topic. Several scholars have also focused on making 
connections between the synchronicity concept and 
recent developments in physics: Mansfield (1995), Card 
(1991), Duch (2002), and Haule (2010a) have all done 
extensive work in this area. Further connections have 
been made between the synchronicity concept and the 
fields of religious studies (Main, 2007a), psychotherapy 
(Main, 2007b), and biology (Haule, 2010a).
 It is safe to say, then, that Jung’s concept of the 
archetype, his ideas about evolution, and his concept of 
synchronicity have all received considerable attention 
from the scholarly community interested in re-examining 
his work in the manner described by Samuels. What has 
gone almost completely unnoticed, however, is that Jung 
himself made a connection between all of these topics. 
Synchronicity, as Jung came to conclude towards the end 
of his life, has a role to play in the process of evolution, 
thus making evolution a meaningful process as opposed 
to a random one, as the Neo-Darwinians hold. Jung only 
mentions what I will call the evolution-synchronicity 
connection in a single letter, written on the 10th of 
March 1959 to his friend Erich Neumann. In this letter 
he described this connection as follows:
It staggers the mind even to begin to imagine the 
accidents and hazards that, over millions of years, 
transformed a lemurlike tree-dweller into a man. In 
this chaos of chance, synchronistic phenomena were 
probably at work, operating both with and against 
the known laws of nature to produce, in archetypal 
moments, syntheses which appear to us miraculous. 
(Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495) 
 Even though the letter was not published during 
Jung’s life, it has now been in publication for a long 
time, as it was included in volume two of the collection 
of letters that was published after his death. Yet despite 
its importance for shedding light on Jung’s exact views 
about evolution, its existence has gone almost entirely 
unnoticed. The only scholars I am aware of who reference 
the letter in an academic publication are Cambray (2002, 
2009), Maine (2004), and Donati (2004). All three, 
however, only devoted a limited amount of attention to 
it, and did not reflect in great detail on its implications. 
Cambray and Maine—both influential and widely 
read interpreters of Jung’s synchronicity concept—have 
offered some short reflections, but in publications that 
do not have Jung’s views on evolutionary theory as their 
sole point of focus. Their attention, then, is by necessity 
on other topics, which means that the views expressed by 
Jung in the Neumann letter represent at the moment a 
thoroughly under-researched aspect of Jung’s theoretical 
framework.
 In this article I will attempt to correct this 
imbalance. After laying the groundwork in section 
one, in which I will examine Jung’s general ideas about 
synchronicity in some detail, I will zoom in on the 
Neumann letter, analyzing it closely to try and tease 
out its exact meaning and implications. Given the fact 
that Jung had so little to say on the synchronicity–
evolution connection—only one letter, with only two 
passages in the letter dealing specifically with evolution 
and synchronicity—this is not an easy task. Luckily 
enough, a collection of texts exists that is highly relevant 
to shedding light on this subject matter: the writings 
on evolutionary theory by Wolfgang Pauli, the Nobel-
prize winning physicist with whom Jung collaborated 
intensively in order to fine-tune his ideas about 
synchronicity. Pauli became heavily interested in biology 
under the influence of quantum physicist Niels Bohr, who 
was writing about this topic as early as the 1930s.2 In the 
1940s, Pauli became especially interested in evolutionary 
theory, which he began researching intensively, as his 
letters reveal.3 Unlike Jung, however, Pauli wrote about 
evolutionary theory extensively, primarily in elaborate 
letters to other physicists. He also published an article 
in an academic journal in which the topic is discussed: 
“Naturwissenschaftliche und Erkenntnistheoretische 
Aspekte der Ideen vom Unbewussten,” published in the 
journal Dialectica in December, 1954 to commorate 
Jung’s 80th birthday.4 In all of these texts Pauli made 
claims about evolution that are virtually identical to 
the views Jung expresses in the Neumann letter. Pauli, 
however, went much more into depth, and explained 
his views much more clearly. This makes his work an 
excellent tool to help clarify Jung’s views.
 After a close analysis of the Neumann letter, I 
will deal with its implications for locating Jung in the 
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wider spectrum of existing evolutionary theories, in the 
final section of this paper. To my mind, the letter presents 
clear evidence that Jung did not think solely along 
Darwinian lines, as has recently been claimed. Although 
there is strong evidence that he sometimes thought along 
Lamarckian lines, the Neumann letter shows quite clearly 
that labeling Jung a Lamarckian does not cover his actual 
position accurately either. Rather, I will argue that Jung 
adopted what Pauli (1953/2002) referred to as a "third 
position" (p. 130)—one that goes beyond both Darwinism 
and Lamarckism. This third position is informed strongly 
by the notion that evolutionary changes are not random 
but meaningful, and that synchronicity has a role to play 
in the way evolution takes shape. As I will argue, this 
means that Jung is not so much a kindred spirit to Neo-
Darwinian evolutionary psychologists but a thinker who 
is much closer in his intuitions and affinities to several 
evolutionary thinkers who have been influential in the 
field of transpersonal psychology, most notably Ken 
Wilber. I will finish the paper by pointing out some of 
these similarities, and by making connections to a wider 
debate within the field of transpersonal psychology, the 
so-called pre-trans fallacy debate.
Jung’s Synchronicity Project: 
Key Definitions and Core Ideas
The synchronicity concept is very much a late development in Jung’s overall intellectual history. 
Even though there are orientating intuitions in his 
early works, the most important published texts about 
this topic were all written by Jung when he was in his 
eighties. His first published work which deals solely with 
the synchronicity concept was the transcription of a talk 
he gave at the Eranos conference, which is published as 
part of volume 8 of the Collected Works under the title 
“On Synchronicity” (1951). Jung’s most important work 
on the topic, however, is the article “Synchronicity: An 
A-causal Connecting Principle” (1952), first published 
as part of a book he co-wrote with Pauli entitled The 
Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche (Jung & Pauli, 
1952/1955). It has also been included in volume 8 of the 
Collected Works. The definition of synchronicity that Jung 
(1952) offered at the start of this article is the following: 
“[The] simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic 
state with one or more external events which appear as 
meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state” 
(para. 850). In order to illustrate what he meant by this, 
he offered the following example: 
A young woman I was treating had, at a critical 
moment, a dream in which she was given a golden 
scarab. While she was telling me this dream I sat 
with my back to the closed window. Suddenly I 
heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping. I 
turned round and saw a flying insect knocking 
against the window-pane from outside. I opened 
the window and caught the creature in the air as it 
flew in. It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab 
that one finds in our latitudes, a scarabaeid beetle, 
the common rose-chafer (Cetonia aurata), which 
contrary to its usual habits had evidently felt an urge 
to get into a dark room at this particular moment. 
(Jung, 1952, para. 843).
 In this example, what Jung (1952) referred to 
in his definition as ‘‘the simultaneous occurrence of a 
certain psychic state with one or more external events” 
(para. 850) is represented by the parallelism between 
the woman telling Jung of her dream about the golden 
scarab (the psychic state) and the beetle flying in through 
the window (the external event). What makes this a 
case of synchronicity is that the two events (the psychic 
and the external event), as Jung (1952) put it, “appear 
as meaningful parallels” (par. 850) to one another. In 
other words: this is a case of a meaningful coincidence, 
with meaningful referring to the fact that there was a 
striking similarity in content between the two events. In 
this example, the similarity in content is very literal: the 
woman literally dreamed of an animal that very closely 
resembled the animal that actually flew in through the 
window. In one of his letters, Jung (1973a) gave another 
example of such a literal case of similarity in meaning: 
a female patient was telling him about a dream she 
had in which a fox was involved, just as an actual fox 
appeared on the forest path along which she and Jung 
were walking (p. 395). 
 Another example given by Jung in his main 
synchronicity essay to illustrate the concept is the 
following one:
I should like to mention another case that is typical 
of a certain category of events. The wife of one of 
my patients, a man in his fifties, once told me in 
conversation that, at the deaths of her mother and her 
grandmother, a number of birds gathered outside the 
windows of the death-chamber. I had heard similar 
stories from other people. When her husband's 
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treatment was nearing its end, his neurosis having 
been cleared up, he developed some apparently 
quite innocuous symptoms which seemed to me, 
however, to be those of heart-disease. I sent him 
along to a specialist, who after examining him told 
me in writing that he could find no cause for anxiety. 
On the way back from this consultation (with the 
medical report in his pocket) my patient collapsed in 
the street. As he was brought home dying, his wife 
was already in a great state of anxiety because, soon 
after her husband had gone to the doctor, a whole 
flock of birds alighted on their house. She naturally 
remembered the similar incidents that had happened 
at the death of her own relatives, and feared the 
worst. (Jung, 1952, par. 844)
 Here the appearance of the birds is meaningful in 
a somewhat different way than the appearance of the beetle 
was meaningful: the birds are symbolically meaningful. 
There is no literal similarity in content between the 
arrival of the birds and the death of the husband, as 
with the scarab and the arrival of the beetle. Rather, a 
symbolic connection exists. As Jung (1952) pointed out in 
“Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle,” birds 
are often used as a symbol of the soul in a mythological 
context (para. 845); the flock of birds, therefore, could be 
interpreted as a death symbol, pointing to the departure of 
the soul from the body and by extension also to the death 
of the husband. If one looks closely at this second example, 
there is another important difference between this case 
and that of the scarab. In that case, there was clearly a 
simultaneous parallel between an external and a psychic 
event. Here, however, no reference seems to be made to a 
psychic state at all—rather, there seems to be a meaningful 
connection between two external events: the death of the 
husband, and the alighting of the birds on the house. 
Jung (1952) clarified, however, that the psychic event in 
this case was an unconscious one: the wife must have had 
some sort of unconscious premonition of the husband’s 
death beforehand, and it was to this unconscious psychic 
state that the arrival of the birds is related as a “meaningful 
parallelism” (para. 850). Because Jung stressed in his 
definition of synchronicity given above that the parallel in 
meaning must occur simultaneously, one must conclude 
that the woman had this unconscious premonition at the 
exact same moment the birds alighted on her house. This 
is indeed what Jung (1952) himself claimed in the text in 
which he brought up this example (para. 850).
 Both examples contain important differences 
from one another, then: on the one hand, between a 
literal parallelism in content and a symbolic parallelism 
in content, and on the other hand between the 
involvement of conscious and unconscious psychic 
content. What connects the two examples, and what 
Jung (1952) stressed in both cases, was that a pattern 
of order and meaning was to be observed, so much so 
that he felt that it was wrong to dismiss the examples 
as mere chance. This is typical of synchronistic events 
in general, according to Jung’s definition: he saw them 
as a parallelism between a psychic and external event 
that appeared to be meaningful. For this reason, Jung 
(1952) also referred to synchronicity as “meaningful 
parallelism” (para. 850) and “meaningful orderedness” 
(para. 948). Jung (1952) eventually came to conclude 
that the meaning observable in synchronistic events is 
not created by the observer of these events (para. 915). 
Many people think of meaning as something that human 
beings create themselves: we give the world its meaning 
by interpreting it and filtering it through our values and 
norms. Jung (1952), however, came to conclude that 
synchronistic events offer evidence that meaning also 
exists independent of human observation (para. 915). 
The arrival of the beetle, for example, was meaningful 
in and of itself—it was not merely meaningful because 
Jung and his patient deemed it to be so. Meaning, in this 
view, is not just something human beings create through 
their conscious interpretation of the world around them; 
rather, it also exists on an a priori level, and for that reason 
Jung (1952) also referred to the meaning that emerges 
in synchronistic events as “transcendental” (para. 915). 
It is this notion of a transcendental, absolute meaning 
that Jung saw as operational in the process of evolution, 
driving it forward in such a way that the creativity 
inherent in it was not blind and random at all, as the 
Darwinist thinkers have been claiming for over a century 
now. It is to that topic that the paper will now turn.5 
Jung and Pauli on the Relationship Between 
Synchronicity and Evolution
Jung was very hesitant to describe, in detail, what his ideas were about evolutionary theory. He 
frequently asserted that he thought the archetypes of 
the collective unconscious were related to mankind’s 
evolutionary history, but he almost never went into 
detail about to which particular theory of evolution 
he subscribed.6 Although he was frequently accused of 
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Lamarckism, there is no reference at all to either Lamarck 
or Lamarckism in the entirety of the Collected Works. 
Jung was also rather notably silent about Darwin and 
Darwinism. He discussed Darwin’s ideas only twice in 
the Collected Works: once in Psychological Types (Jung, 
1921/1960, para. 632), where he used Darwin as an 
example of an extraverted-thinking type, and once in in 
an article from 1928 called On Psychic Energy, where he 
discussed someone else’s interpretation of Darwin, not 
his own (para. 48). Evolution, then, appears to be a topic 
about which Jung did not feel compelled to speculate 
in great detail in his public writings. Nevertheless, if 
one examines Jung's writings carefully, it is certainly 
possible to tease out the outlines of his core ideas about 
this important subject. Many of the passages that allow 
one to do this are, in my opinion, clearly Lamarckian in 
nature. With Lamarckian I do not mean a theory which 
is completely identical with that of Lamarck himself; 
rather, I use it in the general sense, as a theory subscribing 
to the idea that acquired characteristics can be inherited. 
Many passages in Jung's work clearly subscribe to this 
idea. Jung frequently claimed, for example, that the 
archetypes exist because the experiences of our ancestors 
have left an imprint on the innate base of the psyche, for 
example when he wrote the following:
[The archetype] can be conceived as a mnemic 
deposit, an imprint or engram (Semon), which 
has arisen through the condensation of countless 
processes of a similar kind. In this respect it is a 
precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic form, of 
certain ever¬recurring psychic experiences. (Jung, 
1921/1960, par. 748)
 Jung made similar claims throughout his career. 
Although it has been argued that Jung used terms 
such as imprints and deposits figuratively (Stevens, 
2002, p. 76), and that he did not actually believe in 
the fact that acquired characteristics such as imprints 
could be inherited, I believe that there is more than 
enough evidence to suggest that Jung most definitely 
believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics 
(for an overview of this evidence, see Rensma, 2013). 
Nevertheless, I believe there is also clear evidence that 
Jung did not think only along Lamarckian lines, and that 
he also sometimes adopted a theoretical position that 
comes much closer to Darwinism. Jung, for example, 
frequently stated that he believed that consciousness 
arose in human beings because it gave our ancestors 
an evolutionary advantage—an idea that has much 
more in common with Darwin's ideas than it does with 
Lamarck's.7 As Hogenson (2001) has shown, it is also 
an established fact that he was influenced by a number 
of Neo-Darwinian thinkers, most notably James Mark 
Baldwin and Conway Lloyd Morgan.
 Jung, then, appears not to have been a staunch 
Lamarckian, nor was he the Darwinian some Jungians 
have tried to turn him into. Rather, as befitted his 
eclectic character, he borrowed from both, illuminating 
his subject matter by drawing on theories resembling 
both Lamarck's and Darwin's depending on the 
context. As has been pointed out in the introduction 
of this paper, however, a third line of influence on 
Jung's thinking about evolution should be mentioned 
alongside the ideas of Darwin and Lamarck: his own 
concept of synchronicity. To the best of my knowledge, 
not a single passage in the Collected Works deals with this 
subject, which leads me to think that Jung did not feel 
comfortable discussing it in public. In private, however, 
Jung sometimes dropped his guard about topics about 
which he kept silent in public. For that reason, his 
letters can be a very rewarding source of information 
regarding some of his more controversial ideas. This 
is also the case for his ideas about the link between 
synchronicity and evolution. In the letter to Erich 
Neumann from 1959 mentioned in the introduction, 
Jung discussed not only his ideas about evolution in 
some detail, but also linked these ideas very distinctly 
to his ideas about synchronicity. I will not include the 
complete letter here—it can be found in its entirety 
in volume two of Jung’s published letters (1973b, pp. 
494-495) and in Roderick Main’s Jung on Synchronicity 
and the Paranormal (1997). Rather, I will only offer the 
two sections of the letter that are most relevant to the 
present discussion. To allow for a clearer discussion 
afterwards, I have labeled these two sections Fragment 
one and Fragment two; in the letter itself, these appear 
in succession, though not contiguously. 
Fragment one.
It staggers the mind even to begin to imagine the 
accidents and hazards that, over millions of years, 
transformed a lemurlike tree-dweller into a man. In 
this chaos of chance, synchronistic phenomena were 
probably at work, operating both with and against 
the known laws of nature to produce, in archetypal 
moments, syntheses which appear to us miraculous. 
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Fragment two.
The essential thing about [synchronistic] phenomena 
is that an objective event coincides meaningfully 
with a psychic process; that is to say, a physical event 
and an endopsychic one have a common meaning. 
This presupposes not only an all-pervading, latent 
meaning which can be recognized by consciousness, 
but, during that preconscious time, a psychoid 
process with which a physical event meaningfully 
coincides. (Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495)
 One can first reflect on what Jung did not 
mention in this letter: a clear mechanism to account for 
evolution. He did not mention natural selection (one 
such mechanism); nor did he mention the Lamarckian 
mechanism of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
He did, however, describe evolution as a process consisting 
of countless “accidents and hazards,” a veritable “chaos 
of chance.” At the very least, this allows the hypothesis 
that Jung may have been thinking in terms of Darwinian 
natural selection here. After all, it is very much the 
case that “accidents and hazards” are the driving force 
behind Darwin’s concept of natural selection. Random 
mutations give rise to organisms with new features; if 
these new features turn out to give the organism an 
environmental advantage, they will be favored over other 
less well-adapted features in other organisms and passed 
on to future generations. From a Lamarckian perspective, 
it makes much less sense to speak of "accidents and 
hazards" as the driving force behind evolution. In this 
view, an organism acquires new features not because 
of blind chance, but because the organism’s ancestors 
responded to their environment in a meaningful way (in 
the case of the famous Lamarckian interpretation of the 
giraffe’s long neck, the giraffe’s ancestors are claimed to 
have stretched their neck to reach high leaves, passing on 
this slightly longer neck to their offspring). It is likely, 
then, that Jung was using the Darwinian concept of 
natural selection as a starting point in the Neumann 
letter. Jung, however, very distinctly linked this way of 
thinking to synchronicity, arguing that the “accidents 
and hazards” that account for evolution are meaningful, 
giving rise to “syntheses which appear to us miraculous.” 
Evolution as described here by Jung, then, is driven not 
by blind chance, but by meaningful coincidences.
 The hypothesis that this is what Jung had in 
mind when he wrote his letter to Neumann is given 
strong support when one examines the writings on 
evolutionary theory of Wolfgang Pauli, with whom Jung 
collaborated intensively on his theory of synchronicity 
and who held ideas about evolution that are virtually 
identical to the ones put forward in the Neumann 
letter. Unlike Jung, Pauli actually had a strong interest 
in theories of evolution, the evidence for which can be 
found in his letters. In the 1940s he became somewhat 
obsessed with the topic, writing in 1944 to his friend and 
fellow Nobel-prize winner Max Delbrück—who had by 
then switched from physics to biology—that he was 
reading with great interest the work of T. H. Huxley, and 
that he had many questions for him about evolutionary 
theory (Pauli, 1993, p. 212). In the early 1950s Pauli 
continued with this research, the evidence for which is 
again to be found in his letters. His biographer Charles 
P. Enz quoted Pauli as writing the following in 1954 in 
a letter to Delbrück:
"[I] became a bit more interested [in biology] than 
in earlier times since last autumn. It started with 
some remarks of Heisenberg . . . who found a rather 
old Lamarckian book by A. Pauly still worth to be 
read today. . . . Then I talked with O. Klein about 
the matter, who told me about his friend Runnstrom 
in Stockholm, who always attacks Darwinism, after 
he had a couple of drinks and is then re-attacked by 
others who had less drinks than he. (Which seems to 
me rather characteristic.) Then Bohr's letter, which 
you saw, arrived." This is followed by an impressive 
list of recent biological publications that Pauli had 
read. (Enz, 2002, p. 467)
 In his public writings, Pauli did not comment 
on this topic as freely as he did in his letters. He only 
discussed it in one published article, "Ideas of the 
Unconscious from the Standpoint of Natural Science 
and Epistemology" (1954/1994), which he wrote for the 
academic journal Dialectica and which Jung read with 
great interest (see letter 67J, 10th of October 1955, in 
Atom and Archetype, 2001, p. 131). In this article (which 
deals with a host of other topics apart from evolutionary 
theory) Pauli did not go into detail that much about 
his views on evolutionary theory: he merely indicated 
that he had misgivings about the worldview of Neo-
Darwinism, which according to him is very much a 
product of the nineteenth century: 
At present a theoretical model of biological evolution 
seems to have found wide acceptance among 
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bioligists; it is based on a combination of directionless 
(random) mutations with “selection.” The latter, 
taken over from Darwin, expresses the influence 
on the environment. This model of evolution is an 
attempt in line with the ideas of the second half of 
the nineteenth century, to uphold theoretically the 
complete elimination of all trace of teleology. The 
latter must then be replaced in some way by the 
introducing of “chance.” (Pauli, 1954/1994, pp. 161-
162)
 In a 1954 letter to theoretical physicist Victor 
Weisskopf Pauli even went as far as to call this outlook 
the “chance religion of the biologists” (Gieser, 2005, p. 
311). In the Dialectica article Pauli (1954/1994) did not 
really offer an alternative point of view to this "chance 
religion"—he merely criticized it for its over-reliance on 
the concept of blind chance, writing that “the phenomena 
before us, which are certainly highly complex, have not 
as yet been analyzed and understood” (p. 162). In his 
letters, however, Pauli went much more into detail.  The 
letter in which he gave the most elaborate exposition of 
his own alternative point of view is one he sent to one 
of Jung’s collaborators, Marie-Louise von Franz, on the 
30th of October, 1953. To this letter he added an essay 
entitled “The Piano Lesson,” which was not meant for 
publication.8 After Pauli’s death, however, it was published 
as part of the multi-volume series of books with Pauli’s 
letters (1999, pp. 330-341); an English translation, as 
well as an extensive commentary by the Dutch physicist 
Herbert van Erkelens, was later published in the academic 
journal for Jung scholarship, Harvest (Pauli, 1953/2002). 
In this essay Pauli put forward ideas about evolutionary 
theory that match very closely the ideas Jung described 
in his letter to Neumann. Unlike Jung, however, Pauli 
explicitly linked his ideas about the role of synchronicity 
in evolution to Darwin’s concept of natural selection. 
The evolutionary mechanism which he put forward in 
the “The Piano Lesson” is basically Darwinian, resting 
very clearly on natural selection. There is, however one 
small—but highly important—difference in Pauli’s 
account of how evolution works: the genetic mutations 
that give rise to a new adaptation are not caused by a 
process of random chance, but are meaningful. As Pauli 
(1953/2002) put it in “The Piano Lesson”: 
One has, therefore, the impression that the external 
conditions on the one hand, and the genetic mutations 
leading to a proper adaptation on the other hand, are 
not connected in a causal–reproducible way, but that 
these mutations nevertheless emerged meaningfully 
and purposefully as an indivisible whole together 
with the outer circumstances. They correct the 
"blind," random fluctuations of the mutations that 
spring up. (p. 130) 
And elsewhere in the same essay:
[This] assumes the correction of the random 
fluctuations through meaningful and purposeful 
coincidences that are not causally related. Although 
in this way the first appearance of a biological 
adaptation is not regarded as causal, it seems not 
impossible, after what has been said before, to 
understand the further hereditary survival of such a 
gene mutation—once it has "succeeded"—through 
models of a physical-chemical kind. (p. 130)
 Natural selection, then, still has its role to play; 
Pauli, however, added to this the idea of synchronicity 
influencing the seemingly random mutations that lead to, 
as Jung (1973b) put it in his Neumann letter, “syntheses 
which seem to us miraculous” (pp. 494-495). In this 
view, new mutations therefore do not just arise randomly; 
rather, because of the influence of synchronicity, there is 
a heightened chance that mutations will arise that will 
somehow be meaningfully related to the environment. 
As Pauli (1953/2002) put it in “The Piano Lesson”: 
"mutations nevertheless [emerge] meaningfully and 
purposefully as an indivisible whole together with the 
outer circumstances” (p. 130).
 But this is not the total picture of the 
synchronistic view of evolution. As both Jung and 
Pauli stated in their writings on the topic, apart from 
the mutations and the outer circumstances, there is a 
third factor involved in the evolutionary process, and it 
is a factor which most definitely does not get taken into 
account by Darwinian thinkers. The outer circumstances 
and the new mutations are both physical factors; the 
third factor which both Jung and Pauli refer to, however, 
is what Pauli (1953/2002) referred to as a “psychic factor” 
(p. 130). As he explained in “The Piano Lesson”: “In this 
connection I would like to submit the further hypothesis 
that this holistic occurrence of meaningful coincidences 
in biological evolution points to a psychic factor which 
goes hand in hand with them and which on a higher level 
appears as emotionality or excitement” (p. 130).
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 Jung mentioned this psychic factor in the second 
fragment of his letter to Neumann, preferring instead to 
use the term psychoid. In the Neumann letter he had this 
to say on the topic:
The essential thing about [synchronistic] phenomena 
is that an objective event coincides meaningfully 
with a psychic process; that is to say, a physical event 
and an endopsychic one have a common meaning. 
This presupposes not only an all-pervading, latent 
meaning which can be recognized by consciousness, 
but, during that preconscious time, a psychoid 
process with which a physical event meaningfully 
coincides. (Jung, 1973b, pp. 494-495) 
 Jung used the term psychoid often in the 
Collected Works, in reference to processes that behave in 
psyche-like ways but do not take place in a context in 
which consciousness plays any role. In On the Nature of 
the Psyche, Jung defined it as follows: "The word simply 
describes those processes in an organism that are quasi-
psychic, such as the reflex-process” (Jung, 1954, para. 
368). According to Jung, such processes are present in 
all organisms, even down to the simplest amoeba. In the 
case of a worm, an example of such behavior would be 
to come up to the surface when a sound resembling that 
of rain drops hitting the surface can be heard. Even an 
amoeba displays similarly so-called intelligent behavior, 
despite the fact that it does not have a brain.  Keeping 
this basic idea in mind, it perhaps becomes clearer 
what Jung (1973b) meant when he wrote to Neumann 
that one needs to assume that, in pre-conscious times, 
a “psychoid process with which a physical event 
meaningfully coincides” (p. 494) existed. What Jung 
(1931) had in mind here was in all likelihood what he 
elsewhere called “the psychology of the worm, and even 
of the amoeba” (para. 321): processes in living organisms 
that are characterized by meaningful, goal-directed 
behavior. For Jung, such processes could be found in all 
living organisms, which means that for him, psyche is 
not something that arises suddenly when human beings 
arrive on the evolutionary stage—rather, psyche is a 
spectrum, with lower and higher manifestations. Human 
consciousness is simply a higher rung on the evolutionary 
ladder, with a clear continuity existing to psyche-like, or 
psychoid, phenomena in the animal world. 
 But what has all of this got to do with 
synchronicity? Why did both Jung and Pauli feel 
compelled to stress that a psychic (Pauli’s term) or psychoid 
(Jung’s term) factor played a role in evolution? The reason 
for that is simple: because of the way both Jung and Pauli 
came to define synchronicity, a psychic factor must be 
involved, otherwise the phenomenon in question cannot 
be a case of synchronicity. In the letter to Neumann, Jung 
(1973b) briefly mentioned this definition, describing 
synchronicity as a process in which “an objective event 
coincides meaningfully with a psychic process; that is 
to say, a physical event and an endopsychic one have a 
common meaning” (p. 494) In order for something to 
be an example of synchronicity, then, a psychic process 
must be present. Jung is therefore obliged to conclude 
that there must have been psychic events during the 
entire evolutionary process, even at moments when there 
were still no human beings; otherwise, it is impossible 
that the “accidents and hazards” that drive evolution are 
synchronistic. This, then, is the reason that Jung (1973b) 
said that “a psychoid process with which a physical 
event meaningfully coincides” (pp. 494-495) must have 
existed. As this psychoid process will be meaningfully 
related to the outer circumstances, the environment and 
the new mutation are still connected, albeit indirectly. 
This explains why Pauli (1953/2002) wrote in “The Piano 
Lesson” that “these mutations nevertheless emerged 
meaningfully and purposefully as an indivisible whole 
together with the outer circumstances” (PAGE #?).
Conclusion
Here then is an outline of how Jung, and Pauli as well, saw the relationship between synchronicity 
and evolution. There appears to be more than enough 
evidence to support the hypothesis that Jung and 
Pauli held identical views on this topic, which means 
that their respective ideas may reflect a single uniform 
theory of evolution. But where in the current spectrum 
of evolutionary theories should one place their shared 
perspective? To begin with, it should be pointed out 
that even though there are some similarities to both 
Darwinism and Lamarckism, the theory as a whole is 
different from both, something that Pauli (1953/2002) 
acknowledged in “The Piano Lesson”:
According to this hypothesis, which differs from the 
theories of Darwin as well of Lamarck, we encounter 
here a third type of natural law. . .; it assumes the 
correction of the random fluctuations through 
meaningful and purposeful coincidences that are 
not causally related (PAGE #?). 
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 Nevertheless, as Linda van Speybroeck correctly 
pointed out in her article “Exploring Pauli’s (Quantum) 
View on Science and Biology” (2009), this way of looking 
at evolution does not attempt to refute Darwinism 
altogether; rather, it seeks to “refine and/or extend it” 
(PAGE #?). Natural selection still has a role to play—it is 
only in their emphasis on the problematic nature of blind 
chance that Pauli and Jung departed from the Neo-
Darwinists. Despite this shared usage of the concept of 
natural selection, however, most Neo-Darwinian thinkers 
would probably scoff at Jung and Pauli’s suggestion that 
the mutations driving evolutionary change are not caused 
by blind chance but by meaningful coincidences, with 
most probably going as far as to state that this is a clear 
example of a creationist way of thinking. It is certainly 
true that certain creationist thinkers have put forward 
ideas about evolution that seem to closely resemble what 
Jung (1973b) stated in his letter to Neumann. At first 
glance, there may not appear to be that much difference 
between Jung’s statement that certain “syntheses 
which appear to us miraculous” (PAGE #?) have been 
created by a meaningful, acausal process, and, to name 
but one example, creationist thinker Michael Behe’s 
(1996) concept of irreducible complexity—his term 
for evolutionary syntheses that are so complex that, 
according to him, they cannot be explained by natural 
selection. What separates Jung and Pauli from thinkers 
like Behe, however, is that for them there is no ultimate, 
inevitable end-goal to which all of evolution is directed; 
rather, the chance mutations which drive evolution are 
only meaningful in the environmental context of the 
organism that gives rise to the new mutation. They are 
not meaningful because an all-knowing creator is behind 
them; rather, they are meaningful because they correlate 
to the content of the psychoid process is operational in 
the organism that gives birth to offspring with a new 
meaningful mutation. Evolution for Jung and Pauli, 
then, is meaningful, but not directed at pre-determined 
ends. It makes somewhat more sense to compare their 
perspective to that of several well-known authors who 
theorize about evolution from the perspective of chaos 
theory (sometimes referred to as complexity theory). In 
this field, several thinkers have put forward views highly 
similar to that of Jung and Pauli. It exceeds the scope 
of the present paper to investigate these similarities 
properly here—that is a paper topic onto itself, and in 
the context of this paper I merely want to highlight that 
there are some important similarities between the two 
perspectives, especially in their shared critical stance 
towards the Neo-Darwinian notion of blind chance. 
Stuart Kauffman, for example, who studies evolution 
from a complexity perspective at the Santa Fe institute, 
wrote that there “simply was not world enough and 
time for chance to have created life as it exists today" (as 
interviewed in Waldrop, 1992, p. 107). Waldrop (1992) 
made a similar point, writing that:
To make a single protein molecule, for example, 
you might have to chain together several hundred 
amino-acid building blocks in a precise order. That’s 
hard enough to do in a modern laboratory, where you 
have access to all the latest tools of biotechnology. So 
how could such a thing form all by itself in a pond? 
Lots of people had tried to calculate the odds of that 
happening, and their answers always came out pretty 
much the same: if the formation were truly random, 
you would have to wait far longer than the lifetime 
of the universe to produce even one useful protein 
molecule, much less all the myriads of proteins and 
sugars and lipids and nucleic acids that you need to 
make a fully functioning cell. (p. 122)
 Similar views have been expressed by several 
other well-known thinkers who wrote from the 
perspective of chaos theory, for example Jantsch (1980), 
Prigogine (1984), and Laszlo (1987). Their respective 
evolutionary theories are different in the details, but they 
all share as a common starting point the same critical 
stance towards the reliance on blind chance of Neo-
Darwinism—a critical stance they share with Jung and 
Pauli. The most widely read transpersonal author on 
whom these evolutionary thinkers have had an influence 
is, in all likelihood, Ken Wilber9, who theorizes about 
evolution from a perspective that is very much informed 
by the complexity thinkers mentioned above: Kauffman, 
Jantsch, Prigogine, and Laszlo are all frequently 
referenced and acknowledged as influences. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that the view of evolution to 
which Wilber has subscribed is highly similar to Jung and 
Pauli’s as well. I do not want to claim here that the two 
perspectives are identical—nevertheless there is a clear 
pattern of overlap to be noted. As Jung, Wilber does not 
see evolution as driven to meet predefined end-goals, in 
the way certain creationist thinkers hold. Nevertheless, 
he appears to be strongly of the opinion that evolution 
is not random and meaningless, either. As he explained 
in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: “I think the answer these 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 71The Synchronicity of Evolution
modern and mature disciplines give—namely, oops! (and 
therefore, Don't ask!)—is about as infantile a response 
as the human condition could possibly offer” (Wilber, 
1995, p. 5). Putting it in the language of complexity 
theory and making an explicit reference to the work of 
Stuart Kauffman, he phrased the details of his objections 
as follows:
I am not alone in seeing that chance and natural 
selection by themselves are not enough to account 
for the emergence that we see in evolution. Stuart 
Kauffman and many others have criticized mere 
chance and natural selection as not adequate to 
account for this emergence (he sees the necessity of 
adding self-organization). Of course I understand that 
natural selection is not acting on mere randomness 
or chance—because natural selection saves previous 
selections, and this reduces dramatically the 
probability that higher, adequate forms will emerge. 
But even that is not enough, in my opinion, to 
account for the remarkable emergence of some of 
the extraordinarily complex forms that nature has 
produced. (Wilber, 2007, n.p.)
 Jung and Pauli, then, are nowadays joined by 
a wide group of thinkers who have expressed similar 
objections to neo-Darwinian thought. Some of these 
modern critics have also been influential in the field 
of transpersonal psychology, making this an as-yet 
overlooked connection of similarity between Jung’s 
thought and transpersonal psychology. That this 
connection exists seems noteworthy, especially given the 
fact that some thinkers in the transpersonal psychology 
field have distanced themselves from Jung in recent years. 
Somewhat ironically, one of the most influential writers 
in this regard has been Ken Wilber, who has argued in 
several publications that Jung falls victim to what Wilber 
has called the pre-trans fallacy. Jung, according to Wilber 
(1993), consistently confused pre-egoic levels of the psyche 
(the archetypes) with the truly transpersonal dimensions of 
reality. By equating spiritual experience with an experience of 
the archetypes, which Wilber (1993) has defined as inherited 
“collective forms” (p. 182), Jung—as Wilber has interpreted 
him—reduced transpersonal experience to an experience of 
innate biological factors. As he wrote in Grace and Grit:
Jung's major mistake, in my opinion, was to 
confuse collective with transpersonal (or mystical). 
Just because my mind inherits certain collective 
forms does not mean those forms are mystical or 
transpersonal. We all collectively inherit ten toes, for 
example, but if I experience my toes I am not having 
a mystical experience (Wilber, 1993, p. 182).
 Wilber completely overlooked, however, that 
Jung went far beyond mere innate and biological factors 
in his thinking about the concept of the archetype in the 
final phase of his career.10 The ideas Jung put forward 
in his writings about synchronicity reveal this with 
particular clarity. The synchronicity phenomena, as Jung 
concluded in the texts that deal with this concept, point 
to the fact that psyche and matter are both reflections of 
the same underlying transpersonal dimension. In On the 
Nature of the Psyche he phrased this idea as follows:
Since psyche and matter are contained in one and 
the same world, and moreover are in continuous 
contact with one another and ultimately rest on 
irrepresentable, transcendental factors, it is not 
only possible but fairly probable, even, that psyche 
and matter are two different aspects of one and the 
same thing. The synchronicity phenomena point, it 
seems to me, in this direction, for they show that 
the nonpsychic can behave like the psychic, and vice 
versa, without there being any causal connection 
between them. Our present knowledge does not 
allow us to do much more than compare the relation 
of the psychic to the material world with two cones, 
whose apices, meeting in a point without extension 
—a real zero-point—touch and do not touch (Jung, 
1954, para. 418). 
 Jung also used the term unus mundus for 
this transpersonal dimension. According to him, it 
is this “transcendental” (Jung’s term; 1952, para. 915) 
dimension of underlying unity that gives rise to the 
synchronicity phenomena, and is therefore also the 
driving force behind the meaningful coincidences to 
be found in the evolutionary process. The archetypes, 
according to Jung, are what connects us to this unus 
mundus. In my book The Innateness of Myth I describe 
this connection as follows:
The archetype, according to Jung, is what links man 
to this unus mundus. This is because the archetype has 
a strange, dual nature: it is not only a psychological 
structure, but because of its inherently biological 
character it also has a non-psychic, material dimension. 
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... Because of this dual nature of the archetype 
Jung felt that it is the aspect of our being which is 
ontologically closest to the unus mundus. Jung thought 
of the unus mundus as a coincidentia oppositorum, 
to use the medieval philosopher Nicholas of Cusa’s 
famous term. In the unus mundus the opposites come 
together: psyche and non-psyche, spirit and matter. 
According to Jung, this is also true of the archetype. 
The archetype is therefore not only a bridge between 
psyche and matter; it is also what connects man to the 
underlying, transcendental principle which lies at the 
root of the entire cosmos. (Rensma, 2010, p. 45).
 Wilber appears to have overlooked the fact that 
for Jung the archetypes are so important not just because 
they are innate “collective forms” (Wilber, 1993, p. 
182), but also because, in the final phase of his career, 
he came to conclude that they are what connect us the 
unus mundus—a dimension that is truly transpersonal, 
as opposed to the merely innate and biological collective 
unconscious. Archetypes, having been shaped by a 
meaningful evolutionary process, are not merely random 
remnants of mankind’s evolutionary history; rather, they 
are also, as Anthony Stevens (2006) put it, “the product of 
an objective order which transcends both the human mind 
and the external world” (p. 88). Wilber may not be aware 
of the exact details of this final phase of Jung’s intellectual 
development, and may therefore have drawn premature 
conclusions as to Jung’s relevance for transpersonal 
psychology. It is my hope that the information presented 
in this paper has enabled the reader to make a more 
careful judgment as to the nature of Jung’s exact position.
Endnotes
1.  For an overview of the core issues of the debate and 
my own position, see my recent article in the Journal 
of Analytical Psychology, “Analytical Psychology and 
the Ghost of Lamarck” (Rensma, 2013).
2. The text by Bohr which appears to have been 
particularly influential on Pauli in this context was 
“Light and Life,” a transcription of a speech Bohr 
gave in 1932. Jung appears to have read it as wel—a 
reference is made by him to this text in one of his 
earliest letters to Pauli (letter 4J in Atom and Archetype 
(Pauli & Jung, 2001), dated 2nd of November 1933)
3. See for example his letter to Max Delbrück of January 
4, 1944 (Pauli, 1993, p. 212).
4. Dialectica 8, No. 4 (15 December 1954), pp. 283–
303. Published in an English translation as “Ideas 
of the Unconscious from the Standpoint of Natural 
Science and Epistemology” in Writings on Physics 
and Philosophy (Pauli, 1954/1994).
5.  For a more detailed discussion of Jung’s general ideas 
about synchronicity I strongly recommend Roderick 
Main’s (2004) excellent work, The Rupture of Time: 
Synchronicity and Jung’s Critique of Modern Western 
Culture.
6. For an overview of the key issues related to Jung’s 
views on evolution and its link to the concept of 
the collective unconscious, see my articles Analytical 
Psychology and the Ghost of Lamarck (Rensma, 2013).
7. See for example his essay “Analytical Psychology 
and ‘Weltanschauung’” in Collected Works, volume 8 
(1927/1931, para. 695).
8. For more information about the context in which 
Pauli wrote this essay see the excellent  biography 
of his life by C. P. Enz (2002), No Time to be Brief, 
which contains an entire chapter about it.
9. Wilber himself has stopped referring to his own 
work as transpersonal—and has indicated preference 
for the term integral. For a good overview of the 
reasons why Wilber has stopped using the term, 
transpersonal, for his work, see Howard (2005, p. 
184).
10. For an overview of what appear to be the main 
phases in Jung’s development of the concept of 
the archetype, see my book, The Innateness of Myth 
(Rensma, 2010), chapter two. The final phase as 
I define it in this book is the synchronicity phase, 
which lasts from 1951 to the end of Jung’s life.
References
Clarke, J. J. (1992). In search of Jung. New York, NY: 
Routledge.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1997). Evolutionary 
psychology: A primer.  Retrieved from http://www.
psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html
Donati, M. (2004). Beyond synchronicity: The 
worldview of Carl Gustav Jung and Wolfgang Pauli. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 49(5), pp. 1-22. 
doi:10.1111/j.0021-8774.2004.00496.x
Duch, W. (2002). Synchronicity, mind, and matter. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 21, 
pp. 153-168. 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 73The Synchronicity of Evolution
Enz, C. P. (2002). No time to be brief: A scientific 
biography of Wolfgang Pauli. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780198564799.001.0001
Gieser, S. (2005). The innermost kernel: Depth psychology 
and quantum physics. Wolfgang Pauli’s dialogue with 
C.G. Jung. New York, NY: Springer.
Goodwyn, E. (2010). Approaching archetypes: 
Reconsidering innateness. Journal of Analytical 
Psychology, 55(4), pp. 502-521. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
5922.2010.01862.x
Hauke, C. (2000). Jung and the postmodern: The 
interpretation of realities. New York, NY: Routledge.
Haule, J. R. (2010a). Jung in the 21st century (Vol. 1). 
New York, NY: Routledge.
Haule, J. R. (2010b). Jung in the 21st century (Vol. 2). 
New York, NY: Routledge.
Hogenson, G. B. (2001). The Baldwin effect: A neglected 
influence on CG Jung’s evolutionary thinking. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 46(4), pp. 591-611. 
doi:10.1111/1465-5922.00269
Howard, L. (2005). Introducing Ken Wilber: Concepts for 
an evolving world. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse.
Jantsch, E. (1980). The self-organizing universe: Scientific 
and human implications of the emerging paradigm of 
evolution. New York, NY: Pergamon Press.
Jung, C. G. (1921/1960). Psychological types. In The 
collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 6). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1927/1931). Analytical psychology and 
‘Weltanschauung’. In The collected works of C.G. Jung 
(Vol. 8, 2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Jung, C. G. (1928). On psychic energy. In The collected 
works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 8, 2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1931). The structure of the psyche. In 
The collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 8, 2nd ed.). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1951). On synchronicity. In The collected 
works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 8, 2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1952). Synchronicity: An acausal connecting 
principle. In The collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 8, 
2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1954). On the nature of the psyche. In 
The collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 8, 2nd ed.). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jung, C. G. (1973a). Letters 1: 1906-1950. London, UK: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Jung, C. G. (1973b). Letters 2: 1951-1961. London, UK: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Jung, C. G., & Pauli, W. (1952/1955). The Interpretation of 
nature and the psyche. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
Knox, J. (2002). Memories, fantasies, archetypes: 
An exploration of some connections between 
cognitive science and analytical psychology. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 46(4), 613-635. 
doi:10.1111/1465-5922.00270
Laszlo, E. (1987). Evolution: The grand synthesis. Boston, 
MA: New Science Library.
MacLennan, B. J. (2006). Evolutionary Jungian 
psychology. Psychological Perspectives, 49(1), 9-28.
Main, R. (2004). The rupture of time: Synchronicity and 
Jung’s critique of modern Western culture. London, 
UK: Routledge.
Main, R. (2007a). Revelations of chance : Synchronicity as 
spiritual experience. Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press.
Main, R. (2007b). Synchronicity and analysis: Jung 
and after. European Journal of Psychotherapy and 
Counselling, 9(4), pp. 359-371. doi:10.1080/1364253 
0701725924
Main, R. (Ed.) (1997). Jung on synchronicity and the 
paranormal. New York, NY: Routledge.
Mansfield, V. (1995). Synchronicity, science, and soul-
making: Understanding Jungian synchronicity through 
physics, Buddhism, and philosophy. Chicago, IL: 
Open Court.
McDowell, M. J. (2001). Principle of organization: A 
dynamic-systems view of the archetype-as-such. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 46(4), pp. 637-654. 
doi:10.1111/1465-5922.00271
Merchant, J. (2009). A reappraisal of classical archetype 
theory and its implications for theory and practice. 
Journal of Analytical Psychology, 54(3), pp. 339-358. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5922.2009.01784.x
Palmer, M. (1997). Freud and Jung on religion. London, 
UK: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203440803
Pauli, W. (1953/2002). The piano lesson. Harvest, 48(2), 
pp. 122-134. 
Pauli, W. (1954/1994). Ideas of the unconscious from 
the standpoint of natural science and epistemology. 
In Writings on Physics and Philosophy (pp. 149-164). 
New York, NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-
02994-7_19
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 74 Rensma
Pauli, W. (1993). Scientific correspondence volume 3: 1939-
1949 (K. von Meyenn Ed.). New York, NY: Springer 
Verlag.
Pauli, W. (1999). Scientific correspondence volume 4 part 
2: 1953-1954 (K. von Meyenn Ed.). New York, NY: 
Springer Verlag.
Pauli, W., & Jung, C. G. (2001). Atom and archetype: 
The Pauli/Jung letters, 1932-1958. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Prigogine, I. (1984). Order out of chaos: Man’s new 
dialogue with nature. New York, NY: Bantam.
Rensma, R. (2010). The innateness of myth: A new 
interpretation of Joseph Campbell’s reception of C.G. 
Jung. London, UK: Bloomsbury.
Rensma, R. (2013). Analytical psychology and the ghost 
of Lamarck: Did Jung believe in the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics? Journal of Analytical Psychology, 
58(2), pp. 258-277. doi:10.1111/1468-5922.12008
Samuels, A. (1985). Jung and the post-Jungians. 
London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
doi:10.4324/9780203359297
Samuels, A. (2000). Foreword. In C. Hauke, Jung and 
the postmodern: The interpretation of realities (pp. xi-
xv). New York, NY: Routledge.
Stevens, A. (1982). Archetype: A natural history of the self. 
London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Stevens, A. (2002). Archetype revisited: An updated 
natural history of the self (2nd ed.). London, UK: 
Brunner-Routledge.
Stevens, A. (2006). The archetypes. In R. K. Papadopoulos 
(Ed.), The handbook of Jungian psychology (pp. 74-
94). New York, NY : Routledge.
van Speybroeck, L. (2009). Exploring Pauli’s (quantum) 
view on science and biology. In H. Atmanspacher & 
H. Primas (Eds.), Recasting reality. Wolfgang Pauli’s 
philosophical ideas and contemporary science. New York, 
NY: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85198-1_15
Waldrop, M. (1992). Complexity : The emerging science at 
the edge of order and chaos. New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster.
Walters, S. (1994). Algorithms and archetypes: 
Evolutionary psychology and Carl Jung’s theory 
of the collective unconscious. Journal of Social 
and Evolutionary Systems, 17(3), pp. 287-306. 
doi:10.1016/1061-7361(94)90013-2
Wilber, K. (1993). Grace and grit. Boston, MA: Shambhala.
Wilber, K. (1995). Sex, ecology, spirituality: The spirit of 
evolution. New York, NY: Shambhala.
Wilber, K. (2007). Re: Some criticisms of my 
understanding of evolution.  Retrieved from http://
www.kenwilber.com/blog/show/390
About the Author
Ritske Rensma, PhD, teaches philosophy and religious 
studies at University College Roosevelt, an international 
honours college of the University of Utrecht in the 
Netherlands. He is the author of the book The Innateness 
of Myth (2010; London, UK: Continuum), which traces 
the influence of C. G. Jung on the American scholar of 
myth and religion Joseph Campbell. His most important 
research interests are Jungian psychology, evolutionary 
psychology and transpersonal psychology, with a 
particular focus on the relevance of these disciplines for 
understanding religious phenomena. He also has a strong 
interest in Eastern philosophy, particularly Buddhism 
and Daoism.
About the Journal
The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies is a is a 
peer-reviewed academic journal in print since 1981. It is 
sponsored by the California Institute of Integral Studies, 
published by Floraglades Foundation, and serves as the 
official publication of the International Transpersonal 
Association. The journal is available online at www. 
transpersonalstudies.org, and in print through www. 
lulu.com (search for IJTS). 
